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Abstract 
There is a dearth of British tech-companies listing on the London Stock Exchange (LSE), and the LSE lacks a 
large, innovative tech-company such as Google.  The UK Government, concerned as to the loss of UK tech-
companies to foreign acquirors, views the encouragement of UK tech-firm listings as a policy priority.  Dual-
class stock, currently prohibited from the LSE Main Market’s premium-tier, allows founders to list their firms, 
and retain majority-control, while holding significantly less of the cash-flow rights in the company.  This article 
will broach the potential for dual-class stock to attract UK tech-company listings, and extoll the benefits that 
dual-class stock can engender for UK tech-companies and their public shareholders.  The risks of dual-class 
structures will also be discussed, but it will be shown that in a UK regulatory context, in relation to high-growth 
tech-companies, the risks may not be as severe as presumed, and easily moderated through judicious controls.         
__________________________________________________________________________________________     
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The tech-industry loves an acronym.  Google is a constituent of ‘GAFA’, a cabal of four US tech-
company behemoths - Google,1 Apple, Facebook and Amazon.  The Chinese equivalent is ‘BATX’ - 
Baidu, Alibaba, Tencent and Xiaomi.  These companies represent ‘Big Tech’; a term referring to the 
current trend in major tech-companies with inordinate market, public and societal influence.2  As of 
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1 On 2 October 2015, Alphabet, Inc. became the new listed holding company of Google.  Throughout this article, the more 
common brand name, Google, will be used. 
2 R. Foroohar, “We need to talk about Big Tech” Financial Times (3 October 2017) <https://www.ft.com/content/64a20c34-
a769-11e7-93c5-648314d2c72c>  All URLs were last accessed on 1 November 2019 unless otherwise stated. 
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October 2019, the total market capitalisation of the eight companies was nearly $4.4 trillion,3 greater 
than the GDP of all but the largest three or four world economies.  Perhaps more noteworthy is the 
manner in which such companies dominate the technology scene worldwide, consistently developing 
new technologies, software and hardware, and rampantly acquiring other innovative businesses.  
Furthermore, all of these companies are publicly-listed, giving them access to a source of equity 
capital for expansion and research and development (R&D), as well as allowing public shareholders 
to participate in their success and growth.4   
 The UK Government has identified that innovation and investment in R&D are critical to the 
future competitiveness and growth of the UK economy,5 and, to that end, has pinpointed attracting 
tech-firms to the London Stock Exchange (LSE) as a policy priority.6  However, the search for a 
‘British Google’ has proved elusive.  Although numerous UK ‘unicorns’, being private, independent 
start-ups valued at over $1 billion, exist,7 only two tech-companies have been consistent members of 
the FTSE-100 since the dotcom bubble burst of the early 2000s.8  Those two companies, Micro Focus 
plc and Sage Group plc, listed in the 1980s, further highlighting the dearth of new, large tech-
companies listing on the LSE. 
 Many factors could explain the reluctance of UK tech-company founders to list their 
companies, but one aspect is the fear of losing control of the company as a result of the shares 
becoming dispersed amongst public investors upon the company’s initial public offering (IPO).  
Interestingly, six of the eight GAFA and BATX companies (and all of those that have listed in the 
twenty-first century) have utilised mechanisms that allow the founders to continue to control the 
composition of the board of directors and insulate the firm from takeovers (unless the founders 																																																								
3 Data sourced from Bloomberg stock quotes <https://www.bloomberg.com/markets/stocks> 
4 See note 25 below. 
5 The Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy’s Green Paper, “Building our Industrial Strategy” (January 
2017), at 25. 
6 See note 18 below. 
7  CBInsights, “The Global Unicorn Club: Private Companies Valued At $1B+” <https://www.cbinsights.com/research-
unicorn-companies>	
8  N. Fildes, “Busy buyers leave only two UK tech giants standing” Financial Times (14 January 2018) 
<https://www.ft.com/content/39bc9b86-f464-11e7-88f7-5465a6ce1a00> 
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consent) notwithstanding a dispersion of the equity upon IPO.  The most common mechanism 
implemented is dual-class stock.9  The use of dual-class stock allows the founders to hold shares to 
which are attached enhanced voting rights, while the public shareholders own shares which enjoy 
lesser, or no, voting rights.  A founder is therefore able to retain voting-control of the relevant 
company, while holding a minority of the equity.  Google is a case-in-point – the founders, Larry 
Page and Sergey Brin, as of 31 December 2018, owned 51 per cent. of the voting rights of the 
company, but only 11.3 per cent. of the cash-flow rights.10  In the UK, on the most prestigious tier of 
the LSE’s Main Market - the premium-tier - dual-class stock is prohibited, and the concept of one-
share-one-vote (OSOV) is effectively prescribed.  A company with the capital structure of Google 
would not be admitted to a listing on the premium-tier. 
 Dual-class capitalisation has been described in the US as “the most important issue in 
corporate governance today”,11 and, accordingly, the literature in the US is saturated with academic 
studies evaluating the merits of dual-class stock.  However, surprisingly, very little academic 
discourse on dual-class stock has flowed in the UK, even though, at one time, dual-class firms were 
not rare on the LSE, with bastions of the city such as Marks & Spencer, ITV, Whitbread, Shell, 
Burton Group, Ranks and House of Fraser adopting the structure.  As far as this author is aware, this 
is the first article in the era of Big Tech that evaluates dual-class stock purely from a UK standpoint.  
The subject is especially topical, with the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) 12  and the UK 
Government 13  recognising the potential for dual-class stock to support long-term company 
performance and investment in tech-companies.  Even more recently, speculation has been rife that 
the UK Government is exploring the use of dual-class stock as a means to attract the listing of tech 
																																																								
9 Google, Facebook, Baidu, Xiaomi, and Tencent all utilise dual-class stock. 
10  Stock ownership information gathered from Schedule 13G/A filings, Form 4 Statement of Changes in Beneficial 
Ownership filings, and Form 5 Annual Statement of Changes in Beneficial Ownership filings. 
11  J. Coffee, “Dual Class Stock: The Shades of Sunset” CLS Blue Sky Blog (19 November 2018) 
<http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2018/11/19/dual-class-stock-the-shades-of-sunset/> 
12 FCA Discussion Paper DP17/2, “Review of the Effectiveness of Primary Markets: The UK Primary Markets Landscape” 
(February 2017), at Chapter 4 and pp. 8 and 22. 
13 HM Treasury, “Financing growth in innovative firms: Consultation” (August 2017), at 33. 
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start-ups on the LSE.14  A normative assessment of dual-class stock from a UK perspective is long 
overdue.   
 In this article, a normative argument shall be made to liberalise the rules on dual-class stock 
for the benefit of the UK tech-industry specifically.  A detailed study of empirical research will form 
the subject-matter of further study.  In the first section of this article, the dearth of UK tech-company 
listings on the LSE will be discussed.  The next section will outline the journeys taken by UK tech-
companies as alternatives to listing.  The third section will discuss the potential for dual-class 
structure to promote listings.  The final sections of this article will balance the benefits that dual-class 
structure can bring to the success of high-growth tech-companies, with the potential risks to public 
shareholders.  However, it will be argued that the UK’s regulatory and market environment mitigates 
against the most extreme risks, and a relaxation of the premium-tier prohibition of dual-class stock 
could give the UK’s tech-industry the boost that it needs. 
 
THE SHORTAGE OF HIGH-GROWTH TECH-COMPANIES ON THE LSE 
 
The UK has been, and continues to be, a hotbed for science and technology companies.  As of mid-
2019, the UK was home to seventeen tech unicorns.15  However, the emergence of large, privately-
owned tech-companies has not been reflected in the publicly-listed sphere.  UK technology IPOs on 
the LSE have lagged behind the US, with firms from ‘new economy’16 industries listing on the LSE 
between 2007 and 2017 making-up only 14 per cent. of total market capitalisation, compared with 60 
per cent. and 47 per cent. on NASDAQ and the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), respectively.17   																																																								
14  D. Thomas et al, “UK seeks change in listing rules to lure tech start-ups” Financial Times (5 November 2019) 
<https://www.ft.com/content/d4d2da5a-fee8-11e9-be59-e49b2a136b8d> 
15 A. Heathman, “London Tech Week: The unicorn companies at the centre of UK tech” Evening Standard (10 June 2019) 
<https://www.standard.co.uk/tech/london-tech-week-uk-tech-unicorns-list-2019-a4163366.html>; see note 7 above, and 
accompanying text. 
16 The ‘new economy’ has been variously defined, but generally references the economic structure resulting from the 
intersection of globalisation and information technology (M. Pohjola, “The New Economy: facts, impacts and policies” 
(2002) 14 Information Econ. & Policy 133, at 134). 
17 HKEX Concept Paper, “New Board” (June 2017), at 11. 
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Attracting tech-firms to the LSE is a policy objective in the UK,18 for two main reasons.  
Firstly, although an in-depth study of the benefits of burgeoning equity markets is beyond the scope 
of this paper, equity can provide a vital source of financing for tech-companies.  For instance, 
innovative tech-companies with long product-cycles may struggle to procure debt funding without a 
robust profits history.  In 2016, 68 per cent. of US IPOs involved pre-profit companies, rising to 75 
per cent. and 92 per cent. of technology and biotechnology listings, respectively,19 perhaps as a result 
of those companies lacking access to debt funding.  Also, tech-companies seeking finance for long-
term, uncertain projects may be shunned by the debt markets.20  As such, it has been found that R&D 
spending can be throttled without access to the equity markets.21  External equity investment becomes 
essential for those pre-profit firms seeking to commercialise R&D.22  As a source of financing for 
tech-companies, an LSE-listing could encourage innovation, productivity and growth in the economy 
generally.23   Job creation will also be promoted, and the tech-sector will be one of the largest 
providers of employment moving forward. 24   Second, UK individuals, or retail investors, can 
participate in the growth and success of tech-companies if they are listed.25  In contrast, subject to 
exceptions, 26  private companies are not able to easily offer securities to the general public. 27  
Although individuals could garner indirect exposure to such companies through their investments in 																																																								
18 See note 5 above, at p. 67; note 12 above, at Chapter 4; note 13 above, at p. 33). 
19 HKEX Concept Paper (2017) (note 17 above, at p. 15). 
20 M. Maher and T. Andersson, “Corporate Governance: Effects on Firm Performance and Economic Growth” (1999) 
Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development 1, at 36. 
21 K. Gugler (ed.), Corporate Governance and Economic Performance (Oxford 2001), 29; M. Bradley et al, “On the 
Existence of an Optimal Capital Structure: Theory and Evidence” (1984) 39 J. Financ. Econ. 857, at 874. 
22 See note 13 above, at p. 9. 
23 D. Cipollone, “Risky Business: A Review of Dual Class Share Structures in Canada and a Proposal for Reform” (2012) 21 
Dalhousie J. Legal Stud. 62, at 69; K-H. Bae and J. Kang, “Does the Stock Market Benefit the Economy?” (2017) EFMA 
Symposium: Finance and Real Economy Accepted Papers (March 2017). 
24 UK Tech on the Global Stage: Tech Nation Report 2019 (2019) <https://technation.io/report2019/> 
25 S. Feldman, “BNA Insights: IPOs in 2016 Increasingly Include Dual-Class Shareholder Voting Rights” (2016) S.R.L.R. 1, 
at 3. 
26 See e.g. FSMA 2000 (Financial Promotion) Order 2005, SI 2000/1529 as amended (FPO), articles 48 and 50. 
27 Companies Act 2006 (CA 2006), s. 755; Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA 2000), Part II. 
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pension plans, insurance products and investment funds, those institutional investors will desire to 
allocate significant funds to more liquid publicly listed investments.  Furthermore, although such 
institutional investors can invest in tech-companies listed on other exchanges (and will actively seek 
global diversification), a significant proportion of investments by UK funds remains in the UK,28 and, 
therefore, policy-makers are seeking methods to promote the listing of UK tech-companies on the 
LSE specifically. 
 
WHAT’S HAPPENING TO UK TECH-COMPANIES? 
 
If UK tech-companies are not listing on the LSE, it begs the question as to what happens to them?  It 
is possible that UK tech-companies are able to generate the equity-financing that they require without 
having to resort to the public markets.  The distinction between venture capital (VC) and private 
equity is beginning to blur, with large funds, such as Softbank, making huge VC investments in tech-
companies,29 and traditional private equity houses eschewing their usual buy-out strategies in favour 
of minority investments.30  However, even though late-stage VC funding has recently increased in the 
UK, which dominates the European market, it generally lags well behind the levels observed in the 
US.31  Accordingly, in the UK, many tech-companies soon attain a size that is beyond further VC 
funding,32 and the FCA has identified a gap in available financing in the ‘scale-up’ phase during 
																																																								
28 Office for National Statistics (ONS), “MQ5: Investment by insurance companies, pension funds and trusts: October to 
December 2018” (March 2019), at 26. 
29 S. Ghosh and P. Leskin, “SoftBank is reportedly taking control of WeWork. Here's a running list of all the Japanese giant's 
major investments in tech” Business Insider (22 October 2019) <https://www.businessinsider.com/running-list-softbank-
investments-2017-7?r=US&IR=T> 
30 A. Schneider and C. Henrik, Boston Consulting Group, “Private Equity Minority Investments: Can Less Be More” (2 
April 2015) <https://www.bcg.com/en-gb/publications/2015/private-equity-minority-investments-can-less-be-more.aspx> 
31 KPMG Enterprise, “Venture Pulse Q2 2018: Global analysis of venture funding” (July 2018), at 2, 43 and 74; note 12 
above, at p. 26; note 13 above, at p. 14. 
32 S. Rigos, “The UK equity gap, ‘Why is there no Facebook or Google in the UK?’” (2011) Greater London Authority, at 
25. 
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which technology start-ups seek to emerge as large, established businesses.33  Although, as above, the 
UK is home to a number of private company ‘unicorns’, it has been suggested that the UK, in fact, 
underperforms in their creation, and significantly trails the US and China.34 
Even for those UK tech-companies that do survive and become established businesses, it 
seems that the creation of enduring unicorns is the exception rather than the rule.  As shown in Table 
1 appended, in the last five years, numerous large UK tech-companies, two of which were unicorns 
and the others were well on their way to becoming unicorns, have been acquired by foreign 
purchasers.  UK tech-companies are disproportionately the subject of mergers and acquisitions 
(M&A) activity compared with their international peers.35 
Therefore, only a handful of UK tech-companies are developing into large, mature 
businesses, and a great number that do are being bought-out by foreign competitors or investment 
funds.  This is concerning from a policy perspective, since UK investors will not be able to share in 
the success of those firms that are bought-out, and, although such acquisitions may not be associated 
with the wholesale movement of business abroad, they could see a drip-feed of jobs, talent and 
operations to the foreign jurisdiction.  Just as concerning is that, as shown in Table 2 appended, many 
of those large UK tech-firms that do eventually list in the UK are also subsequently bought-out by 
foreign acquirors.  Either way, it does not appear that the UK public equity markets are providing a 
stable, long-term home for UK tech-companies. 
 
LOSS OF CONTROL AS A FACTOR IN ESCHEWING FLOTATIONS 
 
If the UK regulators aspire to encourage more UK tech-firms to list on the LSE, a reasonable starting 
point is to question why such companies are disproportionately susceptible to foreign buy-outs 																																																								
33 See note 12 above, at p. 26 - ‘scale-up companies’ are those with average growth in employees or turnover of more than 
20% per annum over three years, with a minimum of 20 employees at the start.  Also, see note 13 above, at p.11; A. Bravo-
Biosca, “Firm Growth Dynamics across countries” (2016) NESTA working paper no. 16/03 
<https://media.nesta.org.uk/documents/wp16-03_firm_growth_dynamics-17.pdf> 
34 See note 13 above, at p. 12. 
35 See note 12 above, at p. 26. 
 	 8	
compared to their US brethren.  The answer may lie in examining the consequences of listing in the 
UK. 
 The Main Market of the LSE is split into two tiers, and, since 2010, those tiers have been 
labelled the premium-tier, to which greater corporate governance standards are ascribed, and the, 
lower, standard-tier.36  After the naming re-designation, non-voting shares were omitted from the 
premium-tier.  In 2014, in response to a number of high-profile abuses by controlling shareholders,37 
the Listing Rules sourcebook as published by the FCA exercising its primary market functions (the 
Listing Rules) were further amended, introducing two new ‘Premium Listing Principles’ to which 
premium-listed companies would be required to adhere.  Essentially the new principles prescribed 
pure-OSOV on the premium-tier by requiring (i) all equity shares in a class to carry an equal number 
of votes,38 and (ii) the aggregate voting rights of each class of premium-listed shares to be broadly 
proportionate to the relative equity interests of each class in the company.39  In effect, other than 
inferior-voting preference shares where the shareholders are compensated for a lack of voting rights 
with enhanced dividend or distribution rights,40 the FCA formally proscribed the premium-listing of 
classes of shares where the voting rights attached to such shares are disproportionate to their cash-
flow rights.  From a strict reading of the Premium Listing Principles, a structure where the enhanced-
voting shares (superior-shares) are unlisted, and the inferior-voting shares (inferior-shares) are 
premium-listed would not be prohibited.  However, where, under the Listing Rules, matters pertaining 
to premium-listed companies are required to be decided by shareholder-vote, those matters must be 
approved by a resolution of the holders of shares that have been admitted to a premium-listing.41  For 
those matters, the control to which the superior-shareholders aspire will be undermined.  In any case, 
notwithstanding the wording of the Premium Listing Principles, it is unlikely that the FCA would 																																																								
36 Financial Services Authority, “Listing Regime Review: Feedback on CP09/24 and CP09/28 with final rules” (February 
2010). 
37 B. Reddy, “The Fat Controller: Slimming Down the Excesses of Controlling Shareholders in UK Listed Companies” 
(2018) 38 O.J.L.S. 733, at 743 and 757-760. 
38 Listing Rules, Premium Listing Principle 3. 
39 Listing Rules, Premium Listing Principle 4. 
40 Non-voting preference shares are potentially permitted under Listing Rule (LR) 7.2.4G. 
41 LR 9.2.21R. 
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admit a firm’s inferior-shares to the premium-tier where the superior-shares are unlisted, since this 
would deviate from the spirit of the relevant Premium Listing Principles, the purpose of which is to 
‘prevent artificial structures involving multiple classes with different voting powers, which are 
designed to allow control to rest with a small group of shareholders’.42  Even prior to the division of 
the Main Market into two tiers, and the introduction of the 2014 Premium-Listing Principles, since the 
1960s, in response to pressure from powerful institutional investors, the LSE had discouraged the 
quotation of inferior-shares, and indicated that it would use its discretionary powers to refuse 
applications to list inferior-shares on its market in the majority of cases.43  A combination of the 
LSE’s informal prohibition and institutional investor distaste for dual-class stock (increasing the cost 
of equity-capital for dual-class companies) led to most UK-listed dual-class firms unifying their share 
structures into OSOV well before the formal premium-tier prohibition of dual-class stock was 
implemented.44 
 A OSOV-listing on the premium-tier could create complications for a founder.  Upon IPO, as 
the founder sells-down its equity, or dilutes its equity through the issuance of further shares, the 
founder will see the proportion of its voting rights in the company decline.  If the founder’s share of 
the voting rights falls below a majority, for a company incorporated in England and Wales, the 
founder will no longer possess the ability to determine the composition of the board of directors.45  
Since, generally, the power to appoint the company’s management team will reside with the board,46 
the loss of majority-control exposes management.  If the founder is part of the management team, the 
founder loses its protected position and could, therefore, be indirectly dismissed from running the 																																																								
42 FCA Policy Statement PS14/8, “Response to CP13/15 – Enhancing the effectiveness of the Listing Regime” (May 2014), 
at 31. 
43 B. Cheffins (ed.), Corporate Ownership and Control: British Business Transformed (Oxford 2008), 317 and 32; B. 
Cheffins (ed.), Company Law: Theory, Structure and Operation (Oxford 1997), 472 and 475.  
44 Cheffins (2008) (ibid., at pp. 309 and 317); J. Franks and C. Mayer, “Evolution of Ownership and Control Around the 
World: The Changing Face of Capitalism” (2017) ECGI Finance Working Paper No. 503/2017 1, at 13. 
45 See CA 2006, s. 168, and Companies (Model Articles) Regulations 2008, SI 2008/3229 (the Model PLC Articles), article 
20.  In the absence of bespoke articles of association, the Model PLC Articles will apply (CA 2006, s. 20), and, commonly, 
public companies adopt an amended version of the Model PLC Articles. 
46 Model PLC Articles, article 3. 
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company by shareholders holding a majority of the votes.  The firm, and, therefore, management, also 
becomes exposed to a third-party takeover which the founder can no longer block. 
 A founder could list on the premium-tier and retain voting-control, resulting in a ‘OSOV-
controlling shareholder firm’, thereby maintaining its protected position in leading the company.  
However, this entails other compromises.  In order to retain more than fifty per cent. of the voting 
rights, the founder will have to limit both the crystallisation of his/her investment in the company 
through the sale of shares, and the generation of equity funding for company growth through issuing 
shares.  The founder either lists and loses control, or lists and retains control but forsakes the very 
reasons for listing in the first place.  Milo Minderbinder would struggle to formulate such a clear-cut 
‘catch-22’.47 
 Almost as a deus ex machina, the catch-22 scenario could be solved if the adoption of dual-
class stock were permitted on the premium-tier.  A founder could retain superior-shares, while issuing 
inferior-shares to the public, thereby maintaining control of the company by holding a majority of the 
voting rights, while still crystallising significant wealth by selling equity in the company.  Issuances 
of further equity, either at IPO or subsequently, can also be engineered through the sale of newly-
created inferior-shares, thereby limiting the dilution of the founder’s voting rights.  In addition, once 
listed, a founder holding superior-shares can block takeovers, negating concerns that a flotation could 
result in the firm subsequently being acquired and the founder removed from running the firm.  Dual-
class stock would, therefore, also attenuate the loss of listed tech-firms from the Main Market. 
It should be noted that dual-class stock is only prohibited from the premium-tier.  As a matter 
of corporate law, companies have complete freedom to adopt dual-class structures,48 and even in the 
listed-company sphere, dual-class stock listings are permitted on the Alternative Investment Market 
(AIM) and the Main Market’s standard-tier.  However, AIM was established for smaller, growing 
companies, 49  with less onerous listing requirements, and therefore embraces an investor-base 
reflective of the types of companies that list on the exchange.  For a unicorn, a growing mid-stage 
tech-company with high funding requirements, or, indeed, the British Google, it is unlikely that AIM 																																																								
47 Catch-22 by J. Heller (New York 1961); also see N. Wasserman, “The Founder Dilemma” (2008) 86 H.B.R. 102. 
48 Bushell v Faith [1970] AC 1099. 
49 White Page Ltd in association with the London Stock Exchange, “A Guide to AIM” (2010), at 4. 
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would represent a suitable market to promote the levels of liquidity or raise the levels of finance 
required. 
With respect to the standard-tier, an inferiority-complex pervades.  More stringent admission 
requirements apply to the premium-tier, lending it greater prestige.  The stronger corporate 
governance qualities ascribed to the premium-tier beget greater confidence in the market, attracting 
superior levels of investment by a larger number of sophisticated investors.  As a result, issuers are 
themselves attracted to the premium-tier where they can draw greater levels of investment at, 
potentially, a better price than compared to the standard-tier.  Advisors often caution clients against 
choosing the standard-tier for listing.50  Even the FCA has admitted that a standard-listing is often 
considered unattractive for many potential issuers, with the very name connoting ‘second-best’ 
status.51  One may question whether the ‘unattractiveness’ of the standard-tier could be overcome by 
the ‘attractiveness’ of a high-quality dual-class share issuer.  After all, a sophisticated institutional 
investor is unlikely to shoot-itself-in-the-foot and pass-up a ‘hot’ IPO merely due to the second-rate 
perception attached to the ‘standard-tier’ moniker.  However, many of the key continuing corporate 
governance requirements attached to a premium-, but not standard-, listing are exactly the types of 
protections that an institutional investor would regard as essential prior to investing in dual-class 
shares in the UK.  For example, premium-tier companies are subject to regulations surrounding 
related-party transactions, 52  and controlling shareholders of such companies must contractually 
restrict certain of their actions.53  The lower corporate governance standards of a standard-listed 
company would most likely be even more of a deterrent to investors where the company is issuing 
dual-class shares.  The relevant issuer could voluntarily adopt equivalent protections, but such 
protections would not be subject to regulatory oversight, and therefore likely to be contractual or 
implemented through the constitutional documents of the issuer.  Investors would be required to 																																																								
50 See note 12 above, at p. 19. 
51 Ibid., at p. 19. 
52 See note 126 below, and accompanying text.  In the US, investors can also take some comfort from constraints on related-
party transactions (see note 134 below).     
53  Controlling shareholders must enter into ‘relationship agreements’ with their companies (see note 131 below, and 
accompanying text). 
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examine and analyse the relevant contractual and constitutional provisions themselves to ensure 
equivalence to premium-tier regulatory requirements – the appetite of investors to make such 
determinations on a case-by-case basis can be doubted, and it has been suggested that the ability of 
investors to accurately assess more granular elements of a company’s bespoke corporate governance 
qualities is limited.54  
A founder could be further discouraged from a standard-listing since such firms are excluded 
from the UK FTSE-indices.  Certain funds passively track the indices, slavishly only investing in 
index constituents on a weighted-basis,55 and even some active funds could be considered ‘closet-
indexers’56 in that they are either mandated to only invest in specific indices, or they track an index as 
a hedging strategy where the performance of the relevant fund manager is assessed against the 
index.57  As a consequence of such demand, index-inclusion can be associated with greater liquidity 
and higher share prices.58  If a standard-tier firm were to grow to a size that would otherwise be 
worthy of index-inclusion, it would not be able to take advantage of the associated benefits.  
Pertinently, excluding preference shares, there has not been a dual-class share IPO on the standard-tier 
since the re-designation of the Main Market into premium- and standard-tiers, and the exclusion of 
non-voting stock from the premium-tier in 2010.  Although, three companies, Schroders plc 
(Schroders), Hansa Investment Company Limited (Hansa), and Daily Mail & General Trust plc (Daily 
Mail), do have inferior-shares listed on the standard-tier,59 all three were long-time members of the 
																																																								
54 Bebchuk, “Asymmetric Information and the Choice of Corporate Governance Arrangements” (2002) Harvard Law School 
Discussion Paper No. 398 1; L. Bebchuk and K. Kastiel, “The Untenable Case for Perpetual Dual-Class Stock” (2017) 4 Va. 
Law Rev. 585, at 623.  
55  L. Bebchuk and S. Hirst, “Index Funds and the Future of Corporate Governance: Theory, Evidence, and Policy” 
(November 2018) 1, at 15 <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3282794> 
56 S. Hirst and K. Kastiel, “Corporate Governance by Index Exclusion” (2019) 99 B.U.L.R. 1229, at 1250. 
57 B. Cheffins, “The Undermining of UK Corporate Governance (?)” (2013) 33 O.J.L.S. 503, at 513; Hirst and Kastiel 
(2019) (ibid., at p. 1256).  
58 B. Sharfman, “A Private Ordering Defense of a Company's Right to Use Dual Class Share Structures in IPOs” (2018) 63 
Villanova Law Rev. 1, at 4; D. Lund, “Nonvoting Shares and Efficient Corporate Governance” (2019) 71 Stanf. Law Rev. 
687, at p. 711; Hirst and Kastiel (2019) (ibid., at pp. 1253-1254). 
59 FCA’s “The Official List” as of 25 November 2019.    
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Main Market’s former ‘primary-tier’ and found their inferior-shares downgraded to the standard-tier 
upon the prohibition of non-voting stock from the premium-tier becoming effective.  The superior-
shares of Schroders and Hansa continue to be premium-listed, and those of Daily Mail were never 
listed.  The companies’ inferior-shares are subject to standard-listings not through choice, but as a 
result of regulatory exigencies.  Given the rise in recent years of large tech-firms listing in the US 
with dual-class structure,60 the rarity of firms taking advantage of dual-class stock on the standard-tier 
is indicative of the low regard in which the segment is held by issuers. 
A UK tech-firm could also adopt dual-class structure by listing on a foreign exchange such as 
NASDQ or the NYSE.  However, in such a case, the foreign exchange and foreign-based advisors 
will extract the majority of the financial benefits accruing to the listing, which would presumably 
undermine some of the FCA’s policy objectives.  Additionally, as described above, a foreign listing 
would make it more difficult for UK-based retail investors to share in the growth of the relevant 
company.61  In any case, it does not appear that UK tech-firms are racing toward the US exchanges.62  
A number of factors could explain the reticence, including the fact that the success of the listing may 
be hindered by an unfamiliarity in the foreign market with the brand and products of the UK 
company, and the firm will also not be able to leverage the publicity of the listing into better sales in 
																																																								
60 Taking IPOs on NYSE America, NASDAQ and the NYSE with offer prices of at least $5.00, the proportion of tech-
company IPOs adopting dual-class structure rose from 4.9 per cent. in 2004, the year of Google’s IPO, to 34.2 per cent. in 
2018 (J. Ritter, “Initial Public Offerings: Dual Class IPOs” (updated as of 19 December 2018) 
<https://site.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/files/2019/04/IPOs2018DualClass.pdf>). 
61  See note 28 above, and accompanying text.  Additionally, if UK retail investors desire to invest in foreign listed 
companies directly (rather than indirectly through institutional funds) it will involve foreign-based investment accounts and 
unfamiliar regulations. 
62  As of 31 October 2019, only three UK tech-companies had stock listed exclusively on the NYSE – Farfetch Ltd. 
(Farfetch), International Game Technology plc, and Delphi Technologies plc (NYSE, “Current List of All Non-U.S. Issuers” 
(2019) <https://www.nyse.com/publicdocs/nyse/data/CurListofallStocks.pdf>).  Farfetch adopted a dual-class stock structure 
at IPO.  From a search of NASDAQ’s “company list” as of 25 November 2019 
(<https://old.nasdaq.com/screening/company-list.aspx>), only two UK tech-companies had stock listed exclusively on 
NASDAQ – Mimecast Ltd. and IHS Markit Ltd.  
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its main product-market.63  Higher listing costs, with requirements to instruct foreign as well as local 
advisors and to ensure that accounts are compatible with the foreign jurisdiction’s requirements, may 
also deter foreign listings, 64  as may a fear of an unfamiliar litigious culture in the foreign 
jurisdiction.65  The provenance of the pre-IPO investors can also influence the listing jurisdiction, 
with a bias toward UK listings by UK-based investors.66 
 In summary, there could be many reasons why a particular UK tech-company eschews a 
flotation of its stock, including a distaste for increased regulatory oversight and transparency, but the 
catch-22 described above will play heavily on the mind of the founder.  Control is key.  A founder 
will lose control upon a OSOV-listing if it desires to substantially diversify wealth and grow the firm.  
Even in circumstances where a founder sells its private company to a third-party, if the acquiror 
shares a similar vision to the founder, and has a track-record for giving businesses the space to grow 
long-term, the founder may be content to cede voting-control to the acquiror in return for a high 
purchase price, the award of a non-trivial stake in the acquiror, and a degree of autonomy in running 
the business going forward.  The attractions in betting on a known quantity are obvious compared to 
being exposed to a disparate, ever-changing group of public shareholders.  Dual-class stock, on the 
other hand, enables founders to pursue the benefits of a listing while retaining control, evidenced by 
the rising numbers of such listings in the US.67       
 
																																																								
63 M. Pagano et al, “The Geography of Equity Listing: Why Do Companies List Abroad?” (2002) 57 J. Financ. 2651, at 
2658-9. 
64 J. Fanto and R. Karmel, “A Report on the Attitudes of Foreign Companies Regarding a U.S. Listing” (1997) 3 S.J.L.B.F. 
51, at 66. 
65 Ibid., at p. 67. 
66  C. Silva, “Why the LSE can serve tech startups better than Nasdaq or the NYSE” Guardian (10 November 2016) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/business/blog/2016/nov/10/lse-tech-startups-nasdaq-nyse-investors> 
67 See note 60 above. 
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HOW DUAL-CLASS SHARE STRUCTURE COULD BENEFIT UK 
TECH-FIRMS 
 
The lure of dual-class stock does not solely lie in its potential to encourage the listing of tech-firms on 
the LSE.  The adoption of the structure by an issuer can also engender separate benefits for the firm 
itself and its public shareholders.  In this section, the benefits of dual-class stock from the perspective 
of tech-companies will be elucidated.  It is assumed for the purposes of this article that a controller or 
controllers will hold a majority of the voting-rights in the relevant dual-class company.  Taking the 
US as an example, if dual-class firms became common on the premium-tier, the prospect for 
numerous dispersed-ownership dual-class firms would be vanishingly small.68 
At IPO, the founders of Google stated, “we have set up a corporate structure that will make it 
harder for outside parties to take over or influence Google.  This structure will also make it easier for 
our management team to follow the long term, innovative approach emphasized earlier”.69   The 
enabling of taking a long-term approach to business has been oft-cited by academics and regulators 
alike as a benefit attached to the adoption of dual-class stock.70  With control in the hands of the 
superior-shareholders, assuming that the superior-shareholders themselves have a long-term outlook, 
the management team can operate the business without fear that they may be removed if short-term 
metrics are not positive. 71   Furthermore, the market for corporate control, 72  pursuant to which 
																																																								
68 L. Bebchuk and K. Kastiel, “The Perils of Small-Minority Controllers” (2019) 107 Geo. L.J. 1453, at 1496 found that 
83.6% of Russell-3000 dual-class companies have a controlling minority shareholder (an earlier draft noted the figure as 
96.7% of S&P-1500 dual-class firms). 
69 Google Inc. Amendment No. 8 to Registration Statement (filed on 16 August 2004), at 29. 
70 See e.g. D. Fischel, “Organized Exchanges and the Regulation of Dual Class Common Stock” (1987) 54 U. Cm. L. Rev. 
119, at 139; H. DeAngelo and L. DeAngelo, “Managerial Ownership of Voting Rights, A Study of Public Corporations with 
Dual Classes of Common Stock” (1985) 14 J. Financ. Econ. 33, at 35; G. Dent, “Dual Class Capitalization: A Reply to 
Professor Seligman” (1987) 54 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 725, at 764; A. Choi, “Concentrated Ownership and Long-Term 
Shareholder Value” (2018) 8 H.B.L.R. 53, at 59; Z. Goshen and A. Hamdani, “Corporate Control and Idiosyncratic Vision” 
(2016) 125 Yale L.J. 560; SGX, “Consultation Paper on Possible Listing Framework for Dual Class Share Structures” (16 
February 2017) 1, at 9; HKEX, “Concept Paper: Weighted Voting Rights” (August 2014) 1, at 23. 
71 M. Narayanan, “Managerial Incentives for Short-Term Results” (1985) 40 J. Finance 1469, at 1479. 
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moribund short-term share price can lead to predatory takeover offers by third-party acquirors, is 
largely eroded, since a takeover can only proceed with the consent of the superior-shareholders.  In 
contrast, with a robust market for corporate control, management will be at the behest of those 
shareholders who may make misjudgments in accepting predatory takeover offers that are not in the 
best interests of those shareholders or the firm, 73  which can cause management to be overly 
preoccupied with short-term share price in priority to the long-term interests of the company.74  
Whether public shareholders are in fact overall short-term orientated is beyond the scope of this 
article, but studies have shown that even the mere perception that the markets are short-termist can 
influence the behaviour of management,75 and those shareholders with short-term proclivities can 
have a disproportionate impact on managerial behaviour due to the high turnover of stock generated 
by their activities.76  With dual-class stock, management will be less likely to invest in projects with 
observable payoffs that will produce lower returns than projects that are more challenging to monitor, 
or to employ costly signalling devices such as dividend payments, share buy-backs, or leverage to 
inform outsiders that performance is robust where it is otherwise difficult to monitor.77   
The ability to take a long-term approach can particularly benefit tech-companies.  They are 
often involved in product innovation, and, especially in their early, growth-phase years, seek success 
through the exploitation of product-cycles, which can increase R&D investment at the expense of 																																																																																																																																																																												
72 For a description of the market for corporate control, see the seminal work by Henry Manne: H. Manne, “Mergers and the 
Market for Corporate Control” (1965) 73 J. Political Econ. 110. 
73 Lund (2019) (note 58 above, at p. 687); Z. Goshen and R. Squire, “Principal Costs: A Theory for Corporate Law and 
Governance” (2017) 117 Colum. L. Rev. 767, at 784; J. Gordon, “Ties that Bond: Dual Class Common Stock and the 
Problem of Shareholder Choice” (1988) 76 Cal. L. Rev. 1, at 44. 
74 J. Stein, “Takeover Threats and Managerial Myopia” (1988) 96 J. Political Econ. 61. 
75 M. Moore and E. Walker-Arnott, “A Fresh Look at Stock Market Short-termism” (2014) 41 J. Law Soc. 416, at 430 and 
438); A. Brandenburger and B. Polak, “When managers cover their posteriors: making the decisions the market wants to 
see” (1996) 27 RAND J. Econ. 523; N. Mizik, “The Theory and Practice of Myopic Management” (2010) 47 J. Mark. Res. 
594, at 594. 
76 The Kay Review of UK Equity Markets and Long-Term Decision Making: Final Report (July 2012), at 38. 
77 K. Lehn et al, “Consolidating corporate control: Dual-class recapitalizations versus leveraged buyouts” (1990) 27 J. 
Financ. Econ. 557, at 564; Fischel (1987) (note 70 above, at p. 138); A. Alchian and H. Demsetz, “Production, Information 
Costs, and Economic Organization” (1972) 62 Am. Econ. Rev. 777, at 789. 
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short-term profits.78  If founders are under pressure from equity market investors to maintain strong 
short-term profits and distributions, the ability of the founder to pursue such product-cycles will be 
diminished.79  For example, where a firm has a choice between projects with high or low near-term 
uncertainty, even if the project with high near-term uncertainty will be more profitable in the long-
term, with a OSOV dispersed-ownership firm, management may be more likely to pursue the less 
profitable project.  Outside shareholders take longer to determine the possible success of projects with 
high near-term uncertainty, valuing such products less highly, all things being equal, and, as such, 
management requires insulation from removal, while share price may be undervalued, in order to 
pursue the more valuable project.80  The scenario is likely to occur in industries requiring high R&D 
investment, and, therefore, those industries can benefit from the utilisation of dual-class stock.81 
Innovative tech-firms, such a Google and Facebook, also require the investment of firm-
specific capital by management and employees.  Managers will be more likely to invest in firm-
specific human capital, if they are comfortable that their positions are secure in the long-term.82  The 
long-term commitment of the controller can also encourage other employees to invest in the firm-																																																								
78 S. Kupor, “Sorry CalPERS, Dual Class Shares Are A Founder’s Best Friend” Forbes CIO Network (14 May 2013) 
<https://www.forbes.com/sites/ciocentral/2013/05/14/sorry-calpers-dual-class-shares-are-a-founders-best-
friend/#5e896b6412d9> 
79 Google’s founders, in justifying its capital structure, stated: “Technology products often require significant investment 
over many years to fulfill their potential.  For example, it took over three years just to ship our first Android handset, and 
then another three years on top of that before the operating system truly reached critical mass.  These kinds of investments 
are not for the faint-hearted.  We have protected Google from outside pressures and the temptation to sacrifice future 
opportunities to meet short-term demands.” (Alphabet’s 2011 Founders’ Letter (31 December 2011) 
<https://abc.xyz/investor/founders-letters/2011/>). 
80 J. Chemmanur, “Dual Class IPOs: A theoretical analysis” (2012) 38 J. Bank. Finance 305, at 306. 
81 Ibid., at p. 315; Burkart et al, “Large Shareholders, Monitoring, and the Value of the Firm” (1997) Q.J. Econ. 693, at 718; 
Davies et al, “Measuring the Costs of Short-Termism” (2014) 12 J. Financ. Stab. 16, 18.    
82 D. Denis and D. Denis, “Majority owner-managers and organizational efficiency” (1994) 1 J. Corp. Finance 91, at 106; 
DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1985) (note 70 above, p .62); Fischel (1987) (note 70 above, at p. 137); S. Smart and C. Zutter, 
“Control as a motivation for underpricing: a comparison of dual and single-class IPOs” (2003) 69 J. Financ. Econ. 85, at p. 
103; E. Böhmer et al, “The Effect of Consolidated Control on Firm Performance: The Case of Dual-class IPOs” in M. Levis 
(ed.), Empirical Issues in Raising Equity Capital (Indiana 1996), 111. 
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specific human capital so essential in companies with high asset-specificity such as high technology 
industries; the adoption of long-term projects by companies in such industries would give employees 
comfort that the company is committed to long-term relationships with those employees. 83   For 
example, in justifying the company’s dual-class structure, Google’s founders, in their 2011 Founders’ 
Letter to Investors, stated: “Our colleagues will be able to trust that they themselves and their labors 
of hard work, love and creativity will be well cared for by a company focused on stability and the long 
term.”84  The long-term value of intangible assets and human resources may be misjudged by public 
shareholders,85 and commentators have speculated that innovation is promoted in companies where 
there is greater tolerance of short-term moribund share performance.86  Additionally, tech-companies 
often need to develop other important long-term stakeholder relationships, such as with vital 
customers, suppliers or partners.  A reputation for a long-term approach, which is often associated 
with controlling shareholder companies,87 may send a message to potential contracting parties that the 
company’s management can be trusted since they can be assumed to have a desire to manufacture 
long-lasting contractual relationships;88 dual-class stock can promote such a reputation and therefore 
assist in ingraining long-term stakeholder relationships.89  Effectively, management insulation creates 
a permissive environment in which a tech-company can take a long-term view to its business. 																																																								
83 C. Mayer, “Corporate Governance, Competition, and Performance” (1997) 24 Corp. Gov. 152, at 168; note 20 above, at p. 
28. 
84 Alphabet Founders’ Letter (2011) (note 79 above). 
85 R. Gilson, “Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance: Complicating the Comparative Taxonomy” (2006) 119 
Harv. Law Rev. 1642, at 1669. 
86 GUBERNA Position Paper, “Re-Designing Corporate Governance to Promote Innovation” (January, 2016), at 7; G. 
Manso, “Motivating Innovation” (2011) 66 J. Financ. 1823, at 1852.  
87 This is particularly true of family controlled companies – see: B. Cheffins, “Corporate Law and Ownership Structure: A 
Darwinian Link?” (2002) 25 U.N.S.W. L.J. 346, at 363.  Also, see: Mayer (1997) (note 83 above, at p. 168); note 20 above, 
at p. 9.  
88 R. Gilson, “Controlling Family Shareholders in Developing Countries: Anchoring Relational Exchange” (2007) 60 Stan. 
L. Rev. 633, at 643; Cheffins (2002) (ibid., at p. 363). 
89 In the context of takeover defences generally: Cremers et al, “Staggered boards and long-term, firm value, revisited” 
(2017) 126 J. Financ. Econ. 422, at 442; W. Johnson et al, “The Lifecycle Effects of Firm Takeover Defenses” (2018) 1, at 
29 <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2808208>; Mayer (1997) (note 83 above, at p. 168). 
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The support of long-termism through management insulation is also a quality of OSOV-
controlling shareholder-structures, 90  but, even so, if dual-class stock encourages the listing of 
companies with controllers that would not otherwise list with OSOV-structure (due to the 
compromises that must be made),91 the structure should be promoted.  Furthermore, the propensity to 
take a long-term approach may be amplified with dual-class stock since the controller, if it holds a 
disproportionately small level of cash-flow rights, will be less concerned by any short-term personal 
changes in net-worth correlating with share price fluctuations.  With OSOV, share price is apposite if 
the controlling shareholder intends to sell-down equity, but with dual-class stock, it is likely that the 
controller will already have disposed of a substantial proportion of its equity.  Of course, if the market 
is indeed overall short-term orientated, inferior-share price may decline if short-term performance is 
poor, particularly if long-term value is not easily observable, but a diversified superior-shareholder 
controller will be able to stay the course, and those inferior-shareholders who are also long-term 
orientated and continue on the journey with the controller will be able to enjoy those long-term profits 
along with the controller. 
Another benefit of dual-class stock for tech-companies, very much related to the concept of 
long-termism, is that it can support risk-taking.  With OSOV dispersed-ownership firms, a regulatory 
prioritisation of robust monitoring (resulting in various mechanisms, such as independent directors, 
being implemented to substitute for a lack of scrutiny by dispersed-shareholders) has been accused of 
blunting innovation in favour of curtailing the excesses of unfettered management.92  Significantly, 
calculated risk-taking can be critical to the success of growth-phase tech-companies desiring to 
develop transformational and disruptive technologies.93   Two aspects of dual-class structure can 
encourage greater risk-taking and innovation, that could benefit all the shareholders in the company. 
																																																								
90 See note 37 above, at p. 739. 
91 See note 47 above, and accompanying text. 
92 For example: S. Bianchini et al, “Corporate Governance, Innovation and Firm Age: Insights and New Evidence” (2015) 
GREDEG Working Papers Series 2015-05 1; GUBERNA (2016) (note 86 above); B. Reddy, “Thinking Outside the Box – 
Eliminating the Perniciousness of Box-Ticking in the New Corporate Governance Code” (2019) 82 M.L.R. 692. 
93 B. Nagji and G. Tuff, “Managing Your Innovation Portfolio” H.B.R. (May 2012), at 9.  
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Firstly, even though the corporate governance requirements that seemingly inhibit risk-taking 
will still apply to premium-listed dual-class firms, their impact on the controller’s decision-making 
(and risk-taking) will be reduced where the management team is insulated.94  Although the lesser 
effectiveness in controlling shareholder firms generally of independent directors, 95  and the UK 
Corporate Governance Code (UK CGC),96 can be viewed negatively in not constraining the acts of 
controllers, it can also be viewed positively by giving controllers greater freedom to take risks. 
Second, dual-class structure can enhance risk-taking from the perspective of the economic 
incentives of the controller.  In a OSOV dispersed-ownership firm, management will be cautious in 
gambling on a risky, although potentially highly profitable, project if their employment could be 
imperilled by the project resulting in failure.  Even in a OSOV-controlling shareholder firm, where 
management is insulated from outside shareholders, management may still exercise caution, since a 
single large failure could result in a sizeable diminishment in wealth of the controller, to whom they 
owe their employment (or the controller itself will be part of management). 97   This wealth 
consideration in fact seems to dominate over outside shareholder insulation, since OSOV-controlling 
shareholder firms have been shown to be more, rather than less, risk-averse than OSOV dispersed-
ownership firms.98  In contrast, with dual-class stock where the founder has disposed of substantial 
equity, the managers are still insulated from public shareholders by the controller’s voting-power, but 
are also less pre-disposed to considering the wealth-effects of individual decisions since they will 
																																																								
94 Smart and Zutter (2003) (note 82 above, at p. 103). 
95 In the presence of a controlling shareholder, since, ultimately, the controller can determine the composition of the board, 
the true independence of the independent directors has been questioned (note 37 above, at p. 754).   
96 The UK CGC is premised on the concept of disclosure of corporate governance arrangements, giving outside shareholders 
the information they need to instigate change if desired.  However, in the presence of a controlling shareholder, corporate 
governance measures will have been implemented at the behest, or at least with the tacit approval, of the controller. 
97 A. Edmans, “Blockholders and Corporate Governance” (2014) 6 Annu. Rev. Financ. Econ. 23, at 33; also see: Cheffins 
(2002) (note 87 above, at p. 357); C. Holderness, “A Survey of Blockholders and Corporate Control” (2003) FRBNY Econ. 
Policy Rev. 51, at 56; D. Ashton, “Revisiting Dual-Class Stock” (1994) 68 St. John’s L. Rev. 863, at 927; R. Gilson and B. 
Black (eds.), The Law and Finance of Corporate Acquisitions (New York 1995), 784. 
98 M. Faccio et al, “Large Shareholder Diversification and Corporate Risk-Taking” (2011) 24 Rev. Financ. Stud. 3601, at 
3621 (risk was measured by the volatility of profitability). 
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affect the founder less than would have been the case if it had retained a proportionate level of cash-
flow rights.  As such, so long as the single risk does not pose a seismic or terminal threat to the health 
of the company, by making many calculated risks over a long period of time, a talented founder can 
overcome the loss-aversion to individual gambles by assessing the possibility of more ‘winners’ than 
‘losers’ over time. 99   Hence, empirically, firms adopting dual-class stock, concurrently with the 
controller selling-down substantial equity, have been found to be associated with greater risk-taking 
which was beneficial to firm-wealth and all shareholders.100 
Inferior-shareholders in dual-class firms can also garner significant benefits from a talented 
founder being ‘bonded’ to the firm.101  If the controller has already divested of the majority of its 
equity, it has more to lose than gain by selling its shares, since the controller will lose the pecuniary 
and non-pecuniary benefits that it accrues from being in control102 in return for only the price of a 
sliver of equity.103  The strength of the bond would be additionally reinforced in the UK, where 
takeover regulations could make the superior-shares somewhat illiquid - a possible purchaser of 
shares may be deterred from acquiring the superior-shares, since an acquisition of 30 per cent. or 
more of the voting rights would require the bidder to make an offer for all the shares in the company 
under the UK’s mandatory bid rules.104  Accordingly, a purchaser not wishing to obtain control of the 
company (but wishing to acquire a significant equity stake) would be more likely to acquire inferior-
shares and avoid triggering the mandatory bid requirement.  Additionally, much in the same way as a 
reputation for taking a long-term approach can ingrain stakeholder relationships,105 the attachment of 																																																								
99 By analogy, see the wager formulation in D. Kahneman (ed.), Thinking, Fast and Slow (New York 2011), 336. 
100 S. Bauguess et al, “Shareholder diversification, corporate risk taking, and the benefits of changing to differential voting 
rights” (2012) 36 J. Bank Finance 1244, at 1251. 
101 Fischel (1987) (note 70 above, at p. 137); SGX Consultation Paper (2017) (note 70 above, at p. 9).  Also, see note 106 
above. 
102 See ‘WHY PROHIBIT DUAL-CLASS STOCK FROM THE PREMIUM-TIER?’ below 
103 Choi (2018) (note 70 above, at p. 68).  This assumes the absence of a control premium, as would be the case in the UK 
(note 168 below, and accompanying text). 
104 The Takeover Code as published by the UK’s Panel on Takeovers and Mergers (Takeover Code), Rule 9.  Also, see note 
168 below, and accompanying text. 
105 See notes 87-89 above, and accompanying text. 
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a respected founder to a business can generate trust by, and signal quality to, customers and other 
stakeholders.106 
In fact, the controller-bonding hypothesis could be a crucial benefit for inferior-shareholders 
in tech-firms where the vision of the founder is fundamental to the success of the company.  Inferior-
shareholders can garner significant long-term benefits by the founder being bonded to the firm and 
incentivised to develop the firm’s vision over the long-run.  The way in which the company 
differentiates itself from the rest of the market and the founder’s self-perceived ability to outperform 
the market in the long-term has been described as the founder’s ‘idiosyncratic vision’. 107   A 
juxtaposition can be drawn between the decade-and-a-half of financial problems that beset Apple, a 
OSOV-firm, after one of the founders, Steve Jobs, left in 1985 following a dispute with the board,108 
and the continued incumbency of Mark Zuckerberg at Facebook, a dual-class firm, in the face of 
opposition from the board and shareholders to the acquisition of Instagram, Inc. for $1bn in 2012 
(which, by 2018, was valued at $35bn).109 
Of course, if the relevant founder is not talented, given the wide scope granted to him/her 
through dual-class stock to run the business, the bonding effect could, instead, be viewed as a 
detriment.110  However, with dual-class stock, the faith that the public investors possess in the relevant 
founder is critical.  It is less likely that a dual-class IPO of a firm will be successful if potential 
investors do not have faith in the talents and ability of the superior-shareholders.  It is acknowledged 
that, in certain cases, investors may face a ‘Hobson’s Choice’,111 where, in a competitive market 																																																								
106 The attachment of named figures to businesses is particularly felicitous in certain jurisdictions, such as Italy (A. Santoro 
et al “Deviations from the “one share – one vote” principle in Italy: recent developments – multiple voting rights shares and 
loyalty shares” (2015) 5 Bocconi Legal Papers 141, at 164), and India (“Ratan Tata’s Legacy” The Economist (1 December 
2012) <https://www.economist.com/leaders/2012/12/01/ratan-tatas-legacy>). 
107 Goshen and Hamdani (2016) (note 70 above, at p. 577). 
108 M. Weinberger, ‘This is why Steve Jobs got fired from Apple - and how he came back to save the company’ Business 
Insider (31 July 2017) <https://www.businessinsider.com/steve-jobs-apple-fired-returned-2017-7?r=US&IR=T> 
109 CFA Institute, ‘Dual-Class Shares: The Good, The Bad and The Ugly (August 2018), at 8.  
110 See note 152 below, and accompanying text. 
111  ISS M&A Deal Note (North America), “The Tragedy of the Dual Class Commons” (13 February 2012) 1, at 1 
<http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/facebook0214.pdf> 
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between fund managers, investors will be reticent to miss-out on an investment in a company with 
potentially excellent growth prospects,112 especially in a generally weak or small market for IPOs.113  
However, it is difficult to foresee that an IPO of a tech-firm will proceed with dual-class structure if 
the investors do not have at least a modicum of conviction in the abilities of the founder.  For 
example, although the decision by The We Company (WeWork) to abandon its IPO on short-notice 
will have been based partly upon misgivings about the company’s business plan and finances, an 
underlying distrust of the founder’s abilities was exposed when, soon after, it was announced that the 
founder would resign as CEO and potentially relinquish his superior-shares.114  Similarly, it is unlikely 
that Uber would have countenanced a listing prior to the removal of Travis Kalanick, whose 
behaviour had been very publicly denounced, as CEO, and unification of the dual-class structure to 
OSOV.115  Although dual-class shares in the UK previously died-a-death in the last millennium partly 
as a result of institutional investor aversion to the structure,116 the UK boards adopting the structure at 
the time were doing so primarily to protect themselves from a burgeoning hostile takeover market and 
were mainly industrial and retail companies with easily observable long-term growth-prospects, not 
redolent of contemporary, high-growth tech-firms which, as discussed, can particularly benefit from 
the adoption of dual-class stock.  Today, notwithstanding the regular derision levelled at dual-class 
firms by institutional investors in the US,117 evidence is mixed as to whether institutional investors 																																																								
112 T. Wen, “You Can’t Sell Your Firm and Own It Too: Disallowing Dual-Class Stock Companies from Listing on the 
Securities Exchanges” (2014) 162 U. Pa. L. R. 1495, at 1505; A. Winden, “Sunrise, Sunset: An Empirical and Theoretical 
Assessment of Dual-Class Stock Structures” (2018) 3 C.B.L.R. 852, at 899.  
113 Anand, “Governance Complexities in Firms with Dual Class Shares” (2018) 3 Annal. Corp. Gov. 184. 
114 A. Edgecliffe-Johnson and E. Platt, “WeWork founder trades voting power to back SoftBank rescue” Financial Times (21 
October 2019) <https://www.ft.com/content/b9312eee-f440-11e9-b018-3ef8794b17c6> 
115 M. Isaac, “Uber Sells Stake to SoftBank Valuing Ride-Hailing Giant at $48 Billion” The New York Times (December 
28, 2017) <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/28/technology/uber-softbank-stake.html>   
116 See note 44 above. 
117  See e.g. Council of Institutional Investors (CII), “Dual-Class Stock” <https://www.cii.org/dualclass_stock>; 
ProxyInsight, “An interview with W. Robert Main III, Head of Portfolio Company Engagement, Analysis and Voting at 
Vanguard” Proxy Monthly (July 2017), at 4; Calpers Investment Committee, “Dual Class/Non-Voting Shares Update” (April 
2018), at 9; A. Mooney, “Big investors fight back over dual-class shares” Financial Times (24 November 2019) 
<https://www.ft.com/content/bc220535-5055-47ce-811d-fc4a56d32937> 
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actually shun such firms.118  It is likely that if a tech-firm conducts an IPO with dual-class structure, 
the founder will be an individual that the market views as fundamental to the success of the business, 
and public investors will derive value from a founder with an idiosyncratic vision being bonded to the 
firm. 
A counter-argument, though, is that even if institutional investors evade those IPOs where the 
relevant business of the company and the qualities of the founder do not justify dual-class structure, 
permitting dual-class firms on the premium-tier could give them an implicit regulatory seal of 
approval that could attract unsuspecting retail investors.  However, retail investors constitute a 
nominal presence in the UK public equity markets,119 and, as such, an IPO will not proceed, as was 
the case with WeWork in the US, without institutional investor support.  Index trackers that are 
required to invest in the constituents of specific indices (which must be premium-listed to be included 
in the FTSE UK-series) will also not be prejudiced, since they will only be compelled to invest in a 
firm after it has become a member of the relevant index, which can only occur after the IPO has 
completed, which, in turn, is contingent upon substantive non-index-tracker institutional investor 
support. 
 
WHY PROHIBIT DUAL-CLASS STOCK FROM THE PREMIUM-TIER? 
 
Above, it has been outlined that dual-class stock could encourage founders of UK tech-firms to list 
their companies on the LSE, and, having listed, could present substantive benefits to tech-firms, and, 
therefore, long-term shareholder (including public shareholder) value.  One may therefore ponder why 																																																								
118 Finding that institutional investor ownership in dual-class firms was the same or greater than such ownership in OSOV-
firms: R. Anderson et al, “The Dual Class Premium: A Family Affair” (2017) 1, at 28 <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3006669>; 
Smart et al, “What’s in a vote? The short- and long-run impact of dual-class equity on IPO firm values” (2008) 45 J. 
Account. Econ. 94, at 99.  Finding slightly less institutional ownership in dual-class firms:  K. Li et al, “Do Voting Rights 
Affect Institutional Investment Decisions? Evidence from Dual-Class Firms” (2008) 37 Financial Management 713, at 720; 
J. Kim et al, “Multi-Class Shares Around the World: The Role of Institutional Investors” (November 2018) Unpublished 1, 
at 19. 
119 As of 31 December 2018, individual investors only owned 13.5 per cent. of UK quoted shares (ONS, “Ownership of UK 
quoted shares: 2018”). 
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the FCA has prohibited such structures from the premium-tier?  The answer lies in the enigmatic 
nature of dual-class stock - for all the benefits that they present, they can also epitomise risks to public 
shareholders.  In this section, the detriments to public shareholders of dual-class structure will be 
outlined, but also challenged in the context of high-growth tech-firms, and the UK’s regulatory and 
market environment.  It will be argued that the fear held by institutional investors of UK dual-class 
firms may be unwarranted.  
 Since OSOV-controlling shareholder firms are not prohibited from the premium-tier, the mere 
fact that a founder holds the balance of power within the firm and that the management team is 
insulated from removal by the public shareholders, can not be the sole motivation for the dual-class 
stock prohibition.  The answer lies in the distortion to the controlling shareholder dynamic caused by 
the disconnect between the ownership of voting and cash-flow rights.  As the founder progressively 
reduces its cash-flow rights, any exercise by the founder of its control over the company that harms 
the financial health of the company will have less of an impact on the founder’s wealth.  In essence, 
the founder will fail to fully feel the consequences of its actions.120  The concern is that the founder 
will be incentivised to take actions that benefit the founder personally to the detriment of the interests 
of the company and the other shareholders.  Such personal benefits are known as ‘private benefits of 
control’.  The extraction of private benefits can, as follows, manifest itself in a number of actions that 
could be detrimental to inferior-shareholders. 
 An obvious potential mischief is where the founder ‘tunnels’ assets and profits out of the firm 
for its own benefit. 121   Such ‘tunnelling’ could occur through sweetheart deals, the simple 
withdrawing of corporate funds,122 or the appropriation of corporate opportunities.123  In addition, a 
founder could cause the company to enter into transactions with other entities, in which the founder 
																																																								
120 F. Easterbrook and D. Fischel, “Voting in Corporate Law” (1983) 26 J. Law Econ. 395, at 409; H. Hu and B. Black, “The 
New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership” (2006) 79 S. Cal. L. Rev. 811, at 851; HKEX 
Concept Paper (2017) (note 17 above, at p. 18). 
121 S. Johnson et al, “Tunnelling” (2000) NBER Working Paper 7523 1, at 2.  The authors attribute the genesis of the term to 
the expropriation of minority shareholders in the Czech Republic (“as in removing assets through an underground tunnel”). 
122 Ashton (1994) (note 97 above, at p. 916). 
123 D. Solomon, “The Importance of Inferior Voting Rights in Dual-Class Firms” (2017) 1, at pp. 15 and 16). 
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owns a greater proportion of the cash-flow rights than in the relevant company, on non-arm’s length 
terms unfavourable to the relevant company.  Since cash-flow is being diverted to, essentially, the 
founder, inferior-shareholders in the first entity are being expropriated.124  Aspects of English law and 
regulation should, though, curtail tunnelling of this nature.  Out-and-out stealing would clearly be 
fraudulent,125 and the laws in relation thereto are bolstered by the UK’s strong accounting regime and 
financial press, both of which should aid the discovery of blatantly fraudulent acts.  Short of outright 
theft, Chapter 11 of the Listing Rules introduces related-party transaction regulations for premium-
listed companies.126  If a founder holding control as a superior-shareholder127 were to cause a dual-
class firm to enter into a transaction with the founder or one of its associates (including another 
company controlled by that founder), unless the transaction is in the ordinary course of business or 
below the size-threshold that triggers the regulations, prior to entering into the transaction, the 
company’s sponsor128 must confirm that it is fair and reasonable to all shareholders.  If the transaction 
exceeds a further threshold, it must be pre-approved by a vote of the shareholders independent of the 
related-party (the founder, as the superior-shareholder, in this case).129  Furthermore, in the presence 
of a controlling shareholder,130 a premium-listed company must enter into a ‘relationship agreement’ 
																																																								
124 See note 121 above, at p. 7; M. Bertrand et al, “Ferreting Out Tunneling: An Application to Indian Business Groups” 
(2002) 117 Q. J. Econ. 121, at 139. 
125 Fraud Act 2006; also see Theft Act 1968, ss. 17 and 19. 
126 Disclosure requirements also apply to related-party transactions under the International Accounting Standards (IAS 24) 
and, if material, under the FCA’s Disclosure Rules and Transparency Rules sourcebook (DTR) (DTR 7.3) and LR 
21.8.17BR.  For companies incorporated in England and Wales, board approval requirements (excluding the founder and 
associates) would also be required for material related-party transactions (DTR 7.3.8R).   
127  A founder holding a majority of votes would be a related-party as a ‘substantial shareholder’, being, broadly, a 
shareholder holding 10% or more of the votes (LR 11.1.4R). 
128 Premium-listed companies must appoint a person, who must be an authorised person (see: FSMA 2000, s.31) or member 
of a designated professional body (LR 8.6), approved by the FCA to provide sponsor services (LR 8.2) to advise the issuer 
on its listing obligations, and to give assurances to the FCA that the issuer’s responsibilities thereunder are being met. 
129 In relation to the thresholds pertaining to related-party transactions, see LRs 11.1.5R and 11.1.7, and LR 10 Annex 1. 
130 A founder with majority-control would be a ‘controlling shareholder’ for these purposes, being, broadly, a shareholder 
holding 30% or more of the votes (LR App 1.1). 
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with the controlling shareholder,131 under which, inter alia, the controlling shareholder must agree to 
conduct all transactions with the company under arm’s length and normal commercial terms.132  If that 
relationship agreement is breached by, for example, a related-party transaction being entered into 
between the founder and the company on non-arm’s length terms, the thresholds for related-party 
transactions are disapplied,133 and the relevant transaction would require independent shareholder pre-
approval no matter its size or whether or not the transaction is in the ordinary course of business.  
Related-party transaction regulations of this nature should at least limit the most egregious forms of 
tunnelling. 
 The US, where the largest dual-class firms reside, also employs related-party transaction 
protections,134 and it is not a coincidence that truly insidious examples of tunnelling are rare.135  A 
note of caution, though, is that in the OSOV-sphere, related-party transaction controversies have still 
occurred at controlling shareholder companies in the UK.136  Those controversies arose from the 
related-party regulations not covering the relevant transactions, the nature of the transactions creating 
obfuscation as to whether the relevant thresholds had been satisfied, or the narrow definition of 
‘associate’ under the Listing Rules not covering the family member of the controlling shareholder 
transacting with the company.137  As a result, transactions were unintentionally or, perhaps even 
intentionally, not treated as related-party transactions.  Therefore, as suggested by Reddy (2018), it 
may be conducive to tighten-up related-party regulations for controlling shareholder firms (including 
																																																								
131 LRs 6.5.4R and 9.2.2ADR(1). 
132 LR 6.5.4R.  
133 LR 11.1.1AR. 
134 In Delaware, upon a challenge, the Courts may require the company to prove that a conflicted transaction was made on 
the basis of fair price and process, and fair to the public shareholders (Weinberger v UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 703 (Del. 
1983)). 
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Corporation (S. Gilson and B. Villalonga, “Adelphia Communications Corp.’s Bankruptcy” (2010) Harvard Business School 
Case 208-071 1, at 6) and Hollinger International (Cipollone (2012) (note 23 above, at p. 75). 
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Sports Direct International plc (Sports Direct) and Ferrexpo plc (note 37 above, at p. 757 et seq). 
137 Ibid., at pp. 751 and 760, in relation to Sports Direct and ENRC respectively. 
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dual-class firms if they were permitted on the premium-tier) by broadening the definition of associate 
as it pertains to controlling shareholder family-members, and by requiring that all related-party 
transactions, regardless of size, be confirmed by the firm’s sponsor as fair and reasonable to all 
shareholders.138 
The extraction of private benefits could, though, occur more subtly in a manner that does not 
trigger related-party transaction regulations.  For example, a founder may cause a dual-class firm to 
acquire assets or pursue projects that generate personal benefits for the founder, but are not 
shareholder wealth-maximising.  Those benefits may not just be financial in nature.  Non-pecuniary 
benefits could also subsist, such that, in the context of tech-firms, the project is detrimental to 
shareholder-wealth, but represents a ‘pet-project’ for the founder or generates significant publicity and 
fame for the founder owing to its ambition or innovation.139  Similarly, the founder may retain assets 
or persist with projects rather than selling or abandoning them, due to the substantial private benefits 
that the founder can extract.  Inefficient decision-making of this kind has classically been cited by 
advocates of OSOV,140 and could even theoretically lead to dual-class firms becoming inefficiently 
large and evolving into unwieldy conglomerates.141  It is therefore accepted that subtle private benefit 
extraction leading to inefficient decision-making could still prevail in UK dual-class firms. 
In the context of tech-firms, though, two aspects bear consideration.  Firstly, the types of tech-
firms that are likely to benefit from dual-class stock are growth-phase companies that need to invest 
heavily in R&D.  With debt-funding scarce,142 such companies may, post-IPO, have to make regular 
excursions to the equity-markets for further financing.  If the founder has, in the interim, developed a 
reputation for extracting substantial private benefits (assuming that those private benefits have not 
been obscured, and have had a detrimental effect on firm-wealth), the cost of capital will have 
																																																								
138 Ibid., at p. 760.  
139 A. Dyck and L. Zingales, “Private Benefits of Control: An International Comparison” (2004) 59 J. Financ. 537, at 540; 
Gilson (2006) (note 85, at p. 1664).  
140 Easterbrook and Fischel (1983) (note 120 above, at p. 409). 
141 L. Bebchuk et al, “Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership, and Dual Class Equity: The Mechanisms and Agency Costs of 
Separating Control from Cash-Flow Rights” in R. Morck (ed.), Concentrated Corporate Ownership (Chicago 2000), 303. 
142 note 20 above, and accompanying text. 
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increased, making such equity-financing much more expensive. 143   Therefore, although the 
management team’s insulation from the public markets can engender a long-term approach to the 
business, management can not completely disregard short-term consequences.  Of course, a wholesale 
relaxation of the premium-tier prohibition of dual-class firms could open-up the market to non-high-
growth firms, in relation to which the benefits of dual-class stock outlined in this article are possibly 
less relevant, and, therefore, could be overshadowed by the detriments.  Although outside the scope of 
this article, consideration should therefore be given to restricting dual-class stock to certain types of 
companies, or requiring the issuer to justify the need for, and benefits of, dual-class stock on a firm-
specific basis.  The Hong Kong stock exchange (HKEX) requires dual-class firms seeking admission 
to evidence their ‘innovative’ credentials,144 and the exchanges of Singapore (SGX)145 and Tokyo 
(TSE) 146  require justifications based upon the qualities of the firms that make dual-class stock 
beneficial.  The Shanghai stock exchange (SSE) is more granular and only permits dual-class listings 
on a separate board for science or technology companies (the STI Board).147   The FCA should 
consider whether some form of restriction would be germane, although, it is accepted that, in such a 
case, the existing expertise and capacity of the FCA in making such determinations on an on-going 
basis may need to be enriched.  An alternative approach would be for the FCA to play an intrinsic role 
in ensuring that the proposed issuer publicly discloses sufficient information prior to IPO which 
would enable the market to make a fully-informed decision as to whether the rationale for adoption of 
dual-class structure is justified based upon the nature of the company’s business, the company’s 
growth-profile, and the importance of the superior-shareholders to the success of the company. 
Second, a founder will not have disposed of equity in the dual-class firm entirely.  To the 
extent that the founder possesses at least a proportion of equity, it will feel some pain from taking 																																																								
143 In relation to controlling shareholders generally: A. Shleifer and R. Vishny, “A Survey of Corporate Governance” (1997) 
52 J. Financ. 737, at 749; R. La Porta et al, “Legal Determinants of External Finance” (1997) 52 J. Financ. 1131, at 1149. 
144 HKEX Guidance Letter HKEX-GL93-18, “Suitability for Listing with a WVR Structure” (April 2018), at para. 4.2. 
145 SGX, “Consultation Paper: Proposed Listing Framework for Dual Class Share Structures” (28 March 2018), at 2. 
146 TSE, “New Listing Guidebook: 1st and 2nd sections” (2018), at 142. 
147 K. Ho, “Examining the viability to allow dual-class share structure companies to list in the financial market of the 
People’s Republic of China: Lessons and experiences from Hong Kong” (2019) 1, at 26 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3408873&download=yes> 
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actions that are detrimental to firm-wealth.  However, that ‘pain’ palliates at a sharply increasing rate 
as the controller’s cash-flow rights decrease,148 and it appears, in the US context, that controllers of 
dual-class firms reduce their equity holdings over time.  Bebchuk and Kastiel (2017)149 found that for 
the ten largest US dual-class firms (by market capitalisation), at IPO, the controllers of those firms 
held, on average, 30 per cent. of the equity – not an insubstantial level of cash-flow rights.  However, 
post-IPO, as of 2015, the average cash-flow rights held by those controllers, who had retained at least 
effective control of their firms, had fallen to 11.6 per cent.  Therefore, consideration should be given 
as to whether controllers of dual-class firms should, as a quid pro quo to enjoying enhanced voting 
rights, be required to hold a minimum level of equity.  HKEX, for example, requires superior-
shareholders to hold at least 10 per cent. of the equity in the company.150  Determining the minimum 
threshold that adequately constrains controllers can be an ethereal task, and may vary on a firm-by-
firm or, even, controller-by-controller basis.  Furthermore, the level needs to be balanced so that it 
acts as a constraint on the most serious forms of abuse, but not so great that it undermines the ability 
of the controller to take risks and a long-term approach to the business.  Determining the relevant 
threshold is an undertaking for future study, but it is hereby contended that any such threshold should 
embrace a degree of flexibility on a case-by-case basis.151  
Management insulation has been described as a positive trait of dual-class firms, but, it could 
also be described negatively as ‘management entrenchment’.  As long as management satisfies the 
aspirations of the controller, possibly even in priority to the interests of the shareholders as a whole, 
they will not have any fear of losing their employment.  The inability of the public shareholders to 
remove directors is an inherent risk for them, since without the deterrent of removal, managers may 
not perform efficiently or diligently, or, worse, act in a self-serving manner; especially exacerbated 
where the controller only holds a small level of cash-flow rights, reducing the equity-constraining 
																																																								
148 See note 141 above, at p. 295; note 68 above, at p. 1473. 
149 See note 54 above, at p. 608. 
150 HK Listing Rules, Rule 8A.12. 
151 HKEX, for example, recognises that the 10% threshold may be lowered for firms with market capitalisation of HK$80 
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effect.152  Although enabling long-termism and risk-taking have been discussed as benefits accruing to 
dual-class firms in the tech-sphere, if the founder is untalented, pretensions toward long-termism 
could simply be masking a malfunctioning strategy that is harmful to shareholder-wealth in the short- 
and long-term, or risk-taking could be purely speculative and no more calculated than the worst Vegas 
gambler.  With respect to high-growth tech-firms, though, as discussed above, it is likely that the 
public shareholders have invested in the relevant firm at IPO based upon their confidence in the 
abilities of the founder to lead the management of the company.  Empirical evidence from other 
jurisdictions suggests that, for high-growth firms, the market recognises that the benefits accruing to 
the structure outweigh the detriments, since firm valuations for high-growth dual-class firms are 
greater than for matched OSOV-firms.153  If investors had considerable concerns over the future 
performance of the management team, firm valuations would likely be lower.  Of course, outside 
investors are not infallible in judging the abilities of the founder, but their desire to invest at a 
premium would be based upon evidence of past-performance, and firm valuation studies are usually 
conducted over robust periods of time, such that if the founder turned-out to be untalented post-IPO, it 
is unlikely that the valuation premia identified would endure.  This does, though, highlight the 
potential importance of restricting dual-class structure to specific types of firms, as referenced 
above.154 
A critical issue is that the impact of management entrenchment on shareholder-value could 
transmute over time.  Studies have suggested that dual-class firm valuations (and possibly operating 
performances) decline with age of firm155 or time since IPO156 at a greater rate than OSOV-firms to 
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the extent that they are eventually performing worse than matched OSOV-firms.157   Some have 
suggested that this characteristic warrants the mandatory imposition of mechanisms that cause dual-
class structure to automatically convert to OSOV upon the expiry of a period of time since IPO 
(‘time-dependent sunset clauses’).158  On the face of it, in the context of high-growth tech-firms, the 
rationale is sound – during the growth-phase of the firm, dual-class structure enables the founder to 
invest in R&D and long product-cycles that are beneficial in the long-term but the benefits of which 
are perhaps unobservable to the public markets in the short-term; however, once the company has 
matured with completed product-cycles and a stable business plan, it becomes more difficult to 
identify the benefits of the structure to public shareholders, and the detriments will begin to dominate.  
However, rather than the age of the firm itself being the reason for a decline in performance, time is 
merely a proxy for events that are more likely to occur as time passes.159  A key event would be where 
the original founder, in which the investors had placed their faith, transfers control to a third-party.  
Even if that transferee were a family-member of the founder, numerous studies have shown that 
controlling shareholder firms perform worse where control is in the hands of heirs as opposed to the 
original founder. 160   Again, although a detailed consideration of the restrictions that could be 
formulated in parallel with a relaxation of the premium-tier prohibition of dual-class stock is ceded to 
further study, briefly, a relevant consideration would be to ensure that enhanced voting rights are 																																																								
157 However, the results may also be explained by high-growth firms forming a disproportionate percentage of dual-class 
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premised on the original superior-shareholders continuing to hold the superior-shares (or at least 
control of the company), with those shares converting into inferior-shares upon a relevant transfer.  
HKEX,161 SGX,162 TSE163 and SSE164 all include similar requirements for dual-class firms.  Even with 
such a restriction, other events could also occur over time that cause declining performance, such as 
where growth-prospects decline, the original founder’s skills and abilities wane, or the founder sells-
down further equity incentivising greater private benefit extraction.  A requirement for the founder to 
hold a threshold level of equity as referred to above165 could assuage these issues by ensuring that the 
founder thinks twice about extracting pernicious private benefits, or even about continuing in day-to-
day management when shareholder-wealth would be better served by relinquishing management to 
fresh leadership.  By ensuring that the founder owns at least a non-negligible level of ‘skin-in-the-
game’, it will also be less likely to take purely speculative risks mitigating against the actions of a 
poor gambler as mentioned above.  On the other hand, time-dependent sunset clauses are cruder 
mechanisms, being arbitrary in nature - it is impossible to deduce with accuracy at the time of IPO 
exactly when the benefits of dual-class structure will begin to be overshadowed by the detriments.166 
Another criticism of dual-class firms that could be considered to be an egregious form of 
private benefit extraction relates to the generation of ‘control premia’ upon a takeover of the firm.  
Control premia emerge in two respects: (i) an acquiror solely acquires the superior-shares, thereby 
acquiring control without the inferior-shareholders receiving any consideration; or (ii) the acquiror 
acquires all the shares in the company but pays a higher price for the superior-shares as compared to 
the inferior-shares. 
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In the UK, though, the ability to extract control premia is significantly mitigated by 
mandatory bid and comparable treatment requirements.  In relation to public companies registered and 
traded (or with central management and control) in the UK, the Isle of Man or the Channel Islands, 
and certain categories of EEA companies,167 with securities traded on, inter alia, the Main Market, 
mandatory offer rules apply where any persons acting together in concert acquire shares carrying 30 
per cent. or more of the voting rights in that company; such persons must make an offer for all the 
remaining shares of each class in the company, at not less than the highest price offered for a 
particular class of shares in the 12-month period prior to the offer.168  Therefore, with regards to the 
first scenario, a potential acquiror will not be able to acquire control of the company merely by 
making an offer for the superior-shares; an offer for all the shares in the company, no matter the class 
or voting rights attached, must be made.  With regards to the second scenario, with multiple classes of 
shares, a bidder must pay to each class of shareholder at least the highest price paid by the bidder for 
shares of that class during the 12 months prior to the announcement of the offer,169 and offers made 
for each class of shares must be ‘comparable’.170  ‘Comparable’ does not necessarily mean ‘identical’, 
and the Takeover Panel must be consulted,171 but, prima facie, the Takeover Panel will insist that the 
ratio of the offer-values be equal to “the average of the ratios of the middle-market quotations [for 
each class of shares] taken from the Daily Official List over the course of the six months preceding 
the commencement of the offer period’.172  Accordingly, if superior-shares and inferior-shares were 
listed in the UK, investors would not be caught off-guard by any potential control premium, since it 
would be based upon prevailing market prices, and, in any case, it is unlikely that the difference in 
market price between superior-shares and inferior-shares would be large.173 																																																								
167 Takeover Code, Section A3. 
168 Ibid., at Rule 9. 
169 Ibid., at Rule 9.5. 
170 Ibid., at Rule 14.1. 
171 Ibid., at Rule 9.5. 
172 Ibid., at Notes to Rule 14.1. 
173 If inferior-shares and superior-shares were premium-listed, where a controller holds a majority of the voting rights, as a 
result of mandatory offer rules, a minority holding of superior-shares is unlikely to be of substantially greater value to a third 
party as compared to a minority interest in the inferior-shares (A. Stumpf and A. Cline, “Price Differentials Between Voting 
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Of course, where a founder seeks to retain majority-control, in most cases, the superior-shares 
will not be listed.174  In the case of a UK mandatory bid, where the superior-shares are not listed, the 
Takeover Panel would not be able to apply the voting premium formula in assessing ‘comparable’ 
price, if, for instance, a bidder triggers the Takeover Code’s mandatory offer requirements by 
acquiring unlisted superior-shares.  However, in such circumstances, it is difficult to envisage that the 
Takeover Panel will not insist that the same price be paid for equal equity interests, requiring that the 
price paid per listed inferior-share be the same as the highest price paid per unlisted superior-share. 
Although the Takeover Code will cease to apply to EEA firms after the UK leaves the EU,175 
most EU-jurisdictions have also implemented mandatory offer rules. 176   Control premia should 
therefore be irrelevant for the vast majority of premium-listed firms if dual-class stock were 
permitted. 177   In fact, when takeovers of dual-class firms do occur (which would require the 
acquiescence of the controller), since the controller can negotiate directly with the potential acquiror 
and will not sell-out unless it is compensated for the loss of its private benefits,178 takeover prices will 
be higher than with OSOV dispersed-ownership firms.179  Pursuant to the mandatory offer rules, all 
shareholders can share in those higher takeover prices.  
																																																																																																																																																																												
and Nonvoting Stock” Stout Advisory Services <https://www.stout.com/en/insights/article/price-differentials-between-
voting-and-nonvoting-stock/> 4). 
174 With respect to the US: P. Gompers et al, “Extreme Governance: An Analysis of Dual-Class Firms in the United States” 
(2010) 23 Rev. Financial Stud. 1051, at 1056. 
175 The Takeover Panel, Code Committee Response Statement RS2018/2, “The United Kingdom’s Withdrawal from the 
European Union” (6 March 2019), at 10. 
176 Bonellierede, Bredin Prat, De Brauw, Hengeler Mueller, Slaughter and May and Uría Menéndez, “Guide to Public 
Takeovers in Europe” (June 2016). 
177 Out of 1161 Main Market-listed companies, 852 were registered in the UK, Channel Islands or Isle of Man, and 107 were 
registered in another EEA country (LSE, “Company List” (31 December 2018) 
<https://www.londonstockexchange.com/statistics/companies-and-issuers/companies-and-issuers.htm>). 
178 M. Barclay and C. Holderness, “Private benefits from control of public corporations” (1989) 25 J. Financ. Econ. 371, at 
380; Gilson (2006) (note 85 above, at p. 1672). 
179 Empirically, see Bauguess et al (2012) (note 100 above, at p. 1249); Smart and Zutter (2003) (note 82 above, at p. 102). 
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Finally, high executive remuneration has also been identified as a potentially sinister form of 
private benefit extraction. 180   Theoretically, a founder involved in management could cause the 
company to pay himself/herself substantially above-market levels of executive pay, and, with dual-
class stock, the founder may be incentivised to do so through a combination of suffering a smaller 
downside as a result of its smaller equity-holding, and receiving lower regular equity income.  
However, in jurisdictions which mandate high levels of executive pay disclosure, outrageously high 
levels of pay would likely attract significant shareholder, public and media opprobrium, which, 
notwithstanding isolated instances of excessive compensation, should, when purveying the overall 
picture, act as a moderating mechanism in this regard.181  In the UK, quoted companies must prepare a 
directors’ remuneration report which must disclose detailed information relating to directors’ 
remuneration.182  The contents must be publicly disclosed on the company’s website.183  Furthermore, 
in the OSOV-sphere, shareholders have an advisory vote on the implementation of directors’ 
remuneration, and a binding vote on directors’ remuneration policy.184  With dual-class stock, the 
controller will be able to carry the vote.  However, with OSOV-firms, even the loss of non-binding 
advisory votes can cause companies to re-assess their pay policies.185  A similar course could be 
followed with dual-class stock firms, although the Listing Rules would need to be amended to provide 
that such companies disclose the results of voting by shareholders independent of the superior-
shareholders if the superior-shareholders possess voting-control.  Even if one were sceptical as to the 
sagacity of ‘say-on-pay’ votes and disclosure requirements, in the US (which also enjoys high levels 																																																								
180 B. Amoako-Adu et al, “Dual class discount, and the channels of extraction of private benefits” (2013) 16 Adv. Financ. 
Econ. 165, at 195. 
181 ‘Outrage costs and constraints’ as coined by L. Bebchuk and J. Fried (eds.), Pay Without Performance, (Cambridge 
2004), 5. 
182 CA 2006, ss. 420 and 421. 
183 CA 2006, s. 430. 
184 CA 2006, ss. 439 and 439A. 
185 e.g., in 2016, the remuneration committee of BP plc used its discretion to reduce performance-related pay to which the 
CEO was otherwise entitled to avoid ‘formulaic outcomes’, after the company had lost the advisory vote on the 
implementation of the remuneration policy in the previous financial year; and at Persimmon plc, in 2017 the chair, and in 
2018 the CEO, resigned after shareholder and public outrage toward the CEO’s £110 million pay package. 
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of executive pay disclosure 186 ), in practice, executive pay at dual-class firms is not excessive 
compared to OSOV-firms, and, in any case, is very much a drop-in-the-ocean compared to market 
capitalisation. 187   As an extreme example, at Google, the founders famously annually only pay 
themselves $1 in salary.188  Although a dual-class firm controller has the legal power to pay itself any 
sum by way of executive compensation, it is unlikely that high executive remuneration will be a 
significant issue causing public shareholders harm if dual-class firms were permitted on the premium-
tier, and, in any case, the regulators could continue to monitor on an on-going basis whether further 
regulatory intervention is required. 
In summary, although, from a theoretical perspective, dual-class structure can present a 
variety of potential detriments to inferior-shareholders, the most egregious possible acts of controllers 
are restricted by existing qualities of the UK’s market and regulatory environment.  Even in relation to 
more subtle forms of private benefit extraction, with respect to high-growth tech-companies, such 
extraction is not excessive in practice, and can, with measured regulatory revisions, be limited.  For 
the UK tech-industry, it is unlikely that the potential detriments to public shareholders of dual-class 
structure will outweigh the benefits. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Whereas the US and China have surged ahead in the era of Big Tech, with numerous tech-company 
behemoths listed on their (and other) exchanges, the UK has lagged behind.  Despite policy initiatives 
by the UK regulators and UK Government, currently, founders of tech-firms may be deterred from 																																																								
186 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Pub. L. 111–203 (2010)), Subtitle E of Title IX. 
187 e.g., between 2001 and 2007, the average CEO compensation for dual-class firms was $5.2m compared to $4.7m for 
matched OSOV-firms (Amoako-Adu et al (2013) (note 180 above, at p. 183).  Although, Masulis et al “Agency Problems at 
Dual-Class Companies” (2009) 64 The Journal of Finance 1697, at 1707 found more striking results showing that average 
US CEO total compensation between 1995 and 2003 increased by $1.054m as the ratio of insiders’ voting rights to cash-
flow rights rose by one standard deviation, this should be considered in the context of average market capitalisation - in 
2017, the average market capitalisation of a US-listed company was $7.3bn, and even in 2001, the average was above $3bn 
(Ernst & Young, “Looking behind the declining number of public companies” (May 2017), at 3 and 2). 
188 Proxy Statement Schedule 14(A) of Alphabet Inc. (30 April 2019), at 43. 
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listing on the premium-tier of the LSE’s Main Market due to its adherence to OSOV.  Either they will 
need to cede control upon flotation of the company, or they can retain control upon IPO but suffer 
from lower levels of equity fund-raising for growth, and less personal wealth diversification.  
 Dual-class stock can provide an avenue for UK tech-firm listings, enabling founders to 
crystallise wealth and raise substantial equity-capital for growth, while retaining control.  Judging by 
the plethora of recent US tech-firm dual-class IPOs, the countenance of dual-class stock on the 
premium-tier could attract further tech-company flotations.  Once listed, the insulation that dual-class 
structure provides against the short-term proclivities of public shareholders and the market for 
corporate control supports the taking of a long-term approach to the business of the company, 
allowing the founder to invest in R&D, long product-cycles and innovative ideas which can be 
profitable in the long-term, but not easily observable in the short-term, and continue to pursue his/her 
idiosyncratic vision.  Such a founder can also take the risks essential to the success of companies 
operating in an innovative sector.  To the extent that the public shareholders value the abilities of the 
founder, they can benefit from the founder being bonded to the firm for the long-term, which can also 
create consequential upside from the perspective of employee and other stakeholder relationships. 
 A suspicion of dual-class firms persists, though, as a result of the incentives on the controller 
to extract private benefits to the detriment of the interests of the company.  As the cash-flow rights of 
the controller diminish, it will feel less ‘pain’ from taking actions that reduce share value.  However, 
the existing UK market and UK regulatory environment substantially protects inferior-shareholders 
from the most egregious types of expropriation, and with respect to more subtle levels of 
expropriation, in practice, the concerns are overblown.  Therefore, in the UK, the adoption of dual-
class stock should not be feared, and greater consideration should be given to the benefits that could 
be secured by a relaxation of the premium-tier prohibition.  Supplementary regulatory protocols can 
complete the picture and enhance the prospect that the benefits to public shareholders of dual-class 
firms will outweigh the detriments.  Further study will formulate the detailed application of those 
concepts from a UK regulatory standpoint, but it is essential that any restrictions do not compromise 
the underlying benefits of the structure or undermine the ability of a founder to pursue its 
idiosyncratic vision.  If that were the case, a relaxation of the premium-tier prohibition would be a 
fool’s errand, and not attract the listings desired.  
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  The discussion should now evolve from whether or not dual-class shares should be permitted 
on the premium-tier, to how dual-class structure can be promoted on the premium-tier.  The possible 
regulatory restrictions proposed herein could open the door to premium-tier dual-class firms, while 
maintaining the market’s confidence in the premium-tier as a listing segment to which the highest-
levels of corporate governance apply.  Consequently, with those supplementary regulatory restrictions 
in place, those dual-class firms that do list on the premium-tier will see a lower cost of capital than 
would otherwise be the case, further attracting dual-class listings.  Britain should be proud of its tech-
sector, and in turbulent political and economic times, the entrepreneurship and innovation of the UK 
economy needs to be supported and nurtured.  With dual-class shares permitted on the premium-tier 
of the LSE, a supercharged UK tech-industry can flourish, and, finally, the lesser-spotted British 
Google may appear on the horizon. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table 1 
 
UK Private 
Company Target 
Year of Acquisition Acquiror Jurisdiction of 
Acquiror 
Acquisition Price 
DeepMind 2014 Google USA  $650m 
Vero Software 2014 Hexagon AB Sweden  Unannounced 
Swiftkey 2015 Microsoft Corporation USA  $250m 
Onefinestay 2016 Accor France  £177m 
Skyscanner 2016 Ctrip.com 
International, Ltd 
China  $1.4b 
Magic Pony 
Technology 
2016 Twitter, Inc. USA  $150m 
Shazam 2017 Apple Inc. USA  $400m 
Momondo 2017 Booking Holdings USA  $550m 
Silverrail 2017 Expedia USA  $148m 
Vocalink 2017 Mastercard USA $700m 
Nyx Games 2018 Scientific Games USA  $626.5m 
Callcredit 2018 TransUnion USA  $1.4b 
Ziylo 2018 Novo Nordisk Denmark  $800m 
Foundry 2019 Roper Technologies USA  $544m 
 
Table 1 - Large (over £100m) acquisitions of UK private technology companies since 2014 
Sources: ONS, “Mergers and Acquisitions Involving UK Companies” (publications from Q3 2014 to Q2 2019); A. Sword, 
“6 of the biggest UK tech acquisitions by overseas giants” C.B.R. (18 July 2016) <https://www.cbronline.com/internet-of-
things/6-of-the-biggest-uk-tech-acquisitions-by-overseas-giants-4952343/>; A. Hern, “Is the global desire to buy British a 
bad thing for UK tech firms?” Guardian (16 December 2017) <https://www.theguardian.com/business/2017/dec/16/uk-tech-
companies-bought-by-overseas-giants-apple-shazam> 
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Table 2 
 	
UK Listed Company Year of Acquisition Acquiror Jurisdiction of 
Acquiror 
Acquisition Price 
Invensys 2014 Schneider France  £3.4bn 
CSR 2015 Qualcomm USA $2.4bn 
Advanced Computer 
Software 
2015 Vista USA £725m 
ARM 2016 SoftBank Japan £24bn 
KBC 2016 Yokogawa Japan $180.3m 
XChanging 2016 CSC USA  $720m 
PACE 2016 Arris USA  $2.1bn 
Telecity 2016 Equinix USA  $3.8bn 
E2V Technologies 2017 Teledyne 
Technologies 
USA  £620m 
Imagination 2017 Canyon Bridge USA £550m 
Worldpay 2018 Vantiv Inc USA  $10.63bn 
Sophos 2019 Thoma Bravo USA $3.9bn 	
Table 2 – Large (over £100m) foreign buy-outs of UK-listed technology companies since 2014 
Sources: ONS, “Mergers and Acquisitions Involving UK Companies” (publications from Q3 2014 to Q2 2019); J. Kollewe, 
“UK cybersecurity firm Sophos agrees £3.1bn takeover” Guardian (14 October 2019) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/business/2019/oct/14/uk-cybersecurity-sophos-takeover-thoma-bravo> 
 
 
 
 
